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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
F'RANK BAlKE,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-

Ca:-;e 1\" o. 8049

GEORGE BJ:;;CKSTK,1., D, Sheriff

of Sv.lt L<Jke County,
Defendant and Respondent.

PETITIOK FOR REHEARING AND
A:viiCUS CURIAE TIRmF OF' THE STATE OF
UTAH IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On the lOth day of December, 1959, this Court rendered its decision in the above entitled cause wherein it
affirmed the order of the District CoUTt of the Third Judicial District, dismissing the Writ of Habeas Corpus
obtained by Frank Baine. In the public interest, to clarify
the limitations of this decision cmd in order that the Attorney General, as legal counsel and representative for
those state agencies which have to do with the enforcement
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2
and administration of the criminal law, may have a guidepost relative to the pertinency and applicability of this
decision, this petition and request for rehearing is taken
for and on account of the points and grounds hereinafter
set forth.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Little time need be spent in setting forth the facts of
the instant case except that we deem it relevant to add
the following:
Frank Baine, after having been sentenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison, was placed
under the supervision and custody of the Utah State Adult
Probation and Parole Department. Baine was given a stay
of execution for a definite time certain, and such periodic

stays were extended by order of the District Court subsequent thereto until the natural lapse and expiration of
final stay of execution on March 27, 1959.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I.
AN INDIVIDUAL HAVING BEE::-.J" GRANTED
AND ORDERED A STAY OF EXECL'TION OR
PROBATIO::-.J" I::-.J" THE DISCRETION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT, F.OR A DEFINITE TIME
CETITAI~, MAY BE COMMITTED UPON THE
EXPIRA'T'IOI'\ OF SUCH PERIOD WITHOl:T A
HEARING BEING A CONDITION PRECEDENT
THERETO AND WITHOUT VIOLATION OF
THE TI\'DIVIDUAL'S FU:-:IDAMENT AL RIGHTS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
AK J_:\[DIVIDl~AL HAVING BEEN GRANTED
AND ORDERED A STAY OF EXECUTION OR
PROBATION II\ THE DISCRETION OF THE
DISTRICT COURT, FOR A DEFINITE TIME
CERTAI='f, MAY BE COMMITTED UPON THE
EXPIRATION OF S"CCH PERIOD WITHOUT A
HEARING BEING A CONDITION PRECEDENT
THERETO AND WITHOUT VIOLATION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL'S FUNDAME)[TAL RIGHTS.

The District Court of the State of Utah may exercise
its discretion, upon the entering of the judgment of conviction, in its determination whether to commit the defendant immediately to the proper state authorities or
suspend sentence and place the defendant on probation.
The applicable statute has been brought to this Court's
attention heretofore, but we deem it of necessity to reiterate those provisions which we deem critical to a proper
determination of this case. 77-35-17, U.C.A. 1953, provides
in part:
"Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any crime
or offense. if it appears compatible with the public
interest, the court having jurisdiction may suspend

the imposition or the execution of sentence and
may place the defendant on probation for such
period of time as the court shall determ.ine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease
the probation period, and may revoke or modify
any condition of probation. "' "' ~ (Emphasis added).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4
The Legislature of this state, by and through the
above mentioned statute, make:,; no distinction as to the
status of an individual in respect to whether he is granted
limited fr·ecdom under a stay of exerution or probation
under a suspension of sentence, but rather, the 8ection
authorizes the O>urt to suspend the imposition or execution of 8entencc and to place the defendant on probation
for such period of time as the Court shall determine. It
is noted, in this connection, that the Court is in no way
required to place a defendant on probation for an unlimited time during good behavior; the statute is clearly of
a discretionary temper.
It is our contention that a comprehensive review of
the Utah decisions would be timely, none having been

made heretofore. While the appellant and original petitioner herein has oft quoted and eloquently cited the relevant decision.'l in his argument which sets forth a beautiful
message in and of itself, the quotations are quite out of
context with the analyc·es made in such decisions and are
hardly accurate. VV1th due respect to this Court, and
realizing the obligation of this office prescribed by law,
it is the contention of your petitioner that the rule of law
in this jurisdiction is that a limited period of probation
and subsequent commitment upon the natural expiration
thereof does nDt invDlve the revocation of the probationary order, nor does it require a hearing.
In any determination Df this magnitude the classic
decision of State v. Zolantakis, 70 Utah 296, 259 Pac. 1044,
54 ALR 1463 must of necessity be considered. Zolantakis,
on July 2:\, 1925, pleaded guilty to being a persistent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
violator of a law prohibiting the manufacture and use of
intoxicating liquors; judgment was pronounced and sentence wa~ suspended "during the good behavior of said
defendant." During the eXistence of such probation an
order was issued by the District Court to show cause why
the suspension under the sentence should not be vacated
and set aside.
A summary hearing was held on such order; however, the defendant was not questioned or asked to respond
or deny in any way the alleged acts of misconduct, nor
was he advised of the purpose and of the reason for the
issuance of the order, nor was he allowed to cross examine
the State's witnesses. The conclusion and holding of the
Court was that Zolantalcis must be accorded a hearing
surrounding the reasons for the revocation of the suspension of sentence and that the District Judge must grant a
probationer an opportunity to deny and rebut the State's
evidence prior to issuing an order revoking suspension.
This decision ·we deem to be entirely correct as to the facts
presented therein, but completely inapplicable in the case
at bar. Frank Baine had never been placed on probation
during good behavior and for an indefinite periodspecifically he had been granted successive stays of execution, and the controversy in this Court surrounds the
failure of the District Judge- to grant an additional stay.
This decision is clearly within the province of the District
Judge, and we distinguish ZolantakL; on this basis.
The case of Williams v. HarTis, 106 Utah 387, 149
P.2d G40, presents a different set of facts. Appellant was
convicted of burglary, and judgment entered thereon; the
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District Court suspended sentence on December 12, 19~2,
and ordered him to report back to the Court on Febru8.ry
6, 1933. On the latter date the Court issued an order suspending sentence, and thereafter additional stays of execution were granted, the last conunencing on September
25, 1933 and terminating December 18, 1933. On October
22, 1933, Williams appeared before the Court to explain
the commission of a crime recently committed by him in
a sister county during the probationary period. Upon the
admission of Williams, the Court revoked probation. This
Court quoted approvingly therein from Zolantakis and
upheld the revocation of the suspension of sentence by
the Dh:>trict Court. Does the Willi= case stand <L~ authority for the instant situation? The quick answer to this
question is, of course, that it does not, for the facts therein
dealt specifically with the revocation of suspension of
sentence, and the Court was not concerned with the natural expiration of an order suspending sentence from a
definite date to a definite date.
Likewise, McCoy v. Harris, 108 Utah 407, 160 P.2d
721, is limited by its facts to the revocation, cancellation
and rescission of a parole by the Board of Pardons,

Demmick v. Harris, 107 Utah 471, 155 P.2d 721, sets
forth what we believe to be of controlling consideration
in this case. Demmick was convicted of burglary and
sentenced to an indeterminate term; sentence was pronounced and petitioner was thereupon granted a stay
of execution until January 4, 1943, Kovember 28th, 1942,
having been the date of sentencing. On the former date,
the Court ordered Demmick committed to Prison after a
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conversation with him in Chambers. On ha:beas corpus
the petitioner contended that the Court, having placed him
on probation, did so during "good behavior" and that he
w<is, therefore committed without proper hearing. The
language of this Court in that case merits consideration:
"The primary question therefore is: VVas appellant
on the date of sentence, granted an indefinite stay
of execution and placed on probation during good
behavior. * * *
The question must be an;;wered in the negative.
The order, itself, specifically makes the stay one
until a definite time* * "'·" (Emph<.~~is added).
The Court determined that Demmick was in no way placed
on probation during good behavior:
"'Nor do we see anything irregular in the Court's
action in thi;; case in requiring compliance with
conditions usually imposed on those placed on probation during good beh;nc!or, ;_·;; a condition to the
keeping force of the stay order until the date of its
expiration."
The majority opinion in the present case discusses generally the holding in Demmick v. Harris. We submit that
the rule promulgated and handed down by this Court in
the latter decision is and should be the controlling principle in this case. That the District Court may, in its absolute and uncontrolled discretion, place an inidividual on
probation for a definite period, and that upon expiration
of such period, commitment must of necessity follow unless a further suspension is granted, is the final product
of Demmick v. Harris.
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Chief Justice Larson, by his concurring opinion in
Dernrnick, stated:
"Such smy of execu.no;t operated cnly to delay
commiLrr,ent until the day eertain fixed in the stay.
At the expiration of that time, commitment issues
a~. of course, unless the Court by order granL~ a
further stay."
The language in the main opin10n on the original
hearing of the instant matter would seem to indicate that
several members of this Court considered the question of
revocation of probation to be before them. Crockett. J.
writes:
"The question is: What procedure should be
followed in connection with the revocation of
probation."
In order to give to this statement its full value and weight,
the meaning of the word "revocation," as generally applied, should be considered. "Revocation" normally means
or has reference to the following: Recall, make void by
taking back or calling back, reverse, cancel, rescind, annul. llalfm.oon v. Moore, 77 Ida. 247, 291 P.2d 846; Commercial TTWJt Company of Pittsburgh, u. U.S., 96 F. Supp.
712. 717 (D.C. Pa.); In Re Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111, 65
N.E.2d 433, 435. ;.Jot one of these descriptive phrases or
words is an adequate m.easuring stick of the stay of e:xecution of U1e District Court in the case at bar, for such stay
expired of its own motion and without further action or
order. It i~ to go a long "''ay to say that a District Court
in the State of Utah, haYing once granted a stay of execution for a definite time certain, and having not permitted
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an unlimited probation during good behavior, has essentially issued an irrevocable order which must be continued
after and subsequent to its natural expiration and lapse
unless a hearing be had; such, we believe, is not in harmony with the statutory discretion bestowed upon the
Court.
To apply the reasoning of Zolantakis to the instant
facts is to create a right in Baine which was non-existent
heretofore and to extend its rule to an area not intended to
be encompassed. This Court, in Christiamen v. Harris,
109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314, in discussing State v. Zolantakis,
commented:
"There is an ever present tendency to expand such
stzttements to apply to ca~.c3 Vi herein the facts are
entirely different * * *. \Ve are not inclined to
expand the force of such holdings beyond what
the court intended when the cilse wa:> decided.
That case stands for the following proposition:
That a person upon probation without limitation
has a vested right in hi~ personal liberty so long
as he does not violatce the conditions upon ·which
that liberty was granted. * "" *" (Emphasis added).
Further, Justice Wolfe, an eminent jurist in anyone's
record, said in a concurring opinion:
"I have expressed my willingness to go along with
the Zolantakis case if it is construed only as requiring that before probiltion is revoked the probationer be given a hearing on the question of
whether he has violated the conditioru of his
probation." (Emphasis added).
(Christiansen v. Harris, supra.).
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We do note that the main opm10n in the original
hearing briefly discusses the distinction between a stay Of
execution to a definite date and a suspended sentence for
an indefinite period, but the determination by the Court
in this regard is not clear.

CONCLUSION
The District Court of Salt Lake County issued a stay
of execution for a definite time certain to Frank Baine, a
petitioner herein. Such stay of execution expired without
the Court taking any further action. Notice of such expiration and a hearing thereon were not, therefore, neces>;ary. It is the contention of the State of Utah that the
ruling of this Court be in accordance with the arguments
expressed herein.
Your petitioner has not intended to specifically answer the petition and brief of Frank Baine, except to the
extent that thi:-; argument negatives such.
Respectfully Submitted,
\.VALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
ROBEH.T S. CAMPBELL, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF UTAH
Amicus Curiae
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